Patent protection and antitrust policy are two important issues in the process of modern economic development. Patent protection refers to the legal protection provided by the state or government to innovators, ensuring that they have the right to enjoy the economic benefits derived from their innovations. Antitrust, on the other hand, is a policy tool aimed at promoting market competition and preventing the emergence of monopolistic behavior in the market.
These two policies may, in some cases, create a conflict. For example, in certain technological fields, there may be core technology patent monopolies, which can hinder other companies from entering the market and lead to unfair monopolistic behavior. Since patent holders have exclusive rights, they can restrict other companies from using the technology, thus preventing competitors from gaining the corresponding benefits.
To balance the conflict between patent protection and antitrust policies, some countries have established mechanisms such as patent licensing agencies, antitrust agencies, and competition reviews. These mechanisms aim to ensure that patent holders do not abuse their rights while also preventing other companies from forming monopolistic positions in the market. For instance, patent licensing agencies may limit the scope of a patent holder's rights to prevent abuse, while antitrust agencies monitor the market and penalize companies suspected of monopolistic behavior.
However, the laws concerning conviction and sentencing should be as clear as possible, not vague. Vague laws fail to provide citizens with reasonable guidance for the future. Without the guiding function of the law, and without a clear standard for judgment, judicial authorities may not know how to apply the law. Once they don't know how to apply it, they may use it however they wish, resulting in selective law enforcement. This is why the law must be explicit.
Supporting patent protection may lead to monopoly offenses, while supporting antitrust policies may result in patent infringement offenses. These kinds of charges—much like "pocket crimes" such as illegal profiteering—are vague and subjective. Under what circumstances can a patent be used to exercise monopoly power? Under what circumstances can a patent be infringed upon? The definitions are unclear, and there is a lack of clear standards and definitions. Different regions and enforcement agencies may interpret these issues differently, which can lead to unfair law enforcement. This is a breeding ground for selective enforcement, where the determination of whether someone has committed a crime seems not to be decided by the law, but by bribes: no bribe leads to conviction, while a bribe leads to acquittal. This greatly damages the public's trust in the rule of law and gives the impression that power trumps the law. For the public, "pocket crimes" do not provide legal guidance because they cannot clearly understand what constitutes patent protection versus antitrust, or antitrust versus patent protection. This severely undermines the motivation for market innovation.
To solve this dilemma, we believe that antitrust policies are more important than patent protection. Therefore, in the P.I.V.O.T. protocol, we propose a new mechanism that can replace patent protection: Consensus Protection.