Distribution Protocol

Each act of distribution is a value judgment. Only when the information distribution mechanism is just can Web3 become a true value internet. Once AI distribution's black box is closed, it becomes difficult to open; by fully utilizing the advantages of the crowdsourced valuation model in this protocol, we have designed a decentralized information distribution mechanism without AI black boxes.

  1. We divide a user a's social circle into strong connections and weak connections.
  2. If a explicitly adds b to their whitelist, then b is considered a's strong connection. Note that strong connections are asymmetric.
  3. Apart from this, as long as c can find a's ID through any means, c is considered a's weak connection. So theoretically, everyone except strong connections can be weak connections.
  4. Strong connection b can unconditionally push real-time information to a backed by their personal credit. (If b abuses a's trust, they can be removed from the whitelist at any time.) If a determines that b's pushed information has value, b will receive a reward.
  5. a and b cannot collude to exploit rewards, because the game is zero-sum, with b's reward coming from a. However, the zero-sum nature doesn't prevent a from making honest value assessments, because if a's valuation is positive and aligns with consensus, a will receive greater long-term benefits.
  6. Weak connection c can also push real-time information to a, but must attach a red packet (bonus) with an amount greater than a's preset threshold. However, c still has motivation to send red packets to a because similarly, if a determines c's pushed information has value, c will receive a reward. c bears the risk of whether the return exceeds the cost (red packet).

Nash Equilibrium

When Valued Information Has Worth

\ a confirms value a denies value
b pushes to a 130,120 107,0
b doesn't push 107,0 107,0
\ a confirms value a denies value
c pushes to a (red packet=10) 120,130 97,10
c doesn't push 107,0 107,0

When Valued Information Has No Worth

\ a confirms value a denies value
b pushes to a -90,-100 -100-Δ†,0
b doesn't push -100,0 -100,0

† Due to pushing spam information, b risks being removed from a's whitelist.

\ a confirms value a denies value
c pushes to a (red packet=10) -100,-90 -110,10
c doesn't push -100,0 -100,0

As can be seen, regardless of the situation, the Nash equilibrium points are always in positions that align with both economics and ethics.

Prompt What You Want